An attempt to outline a framework for 'self', 'academic' philosophy

One of the most heated debates in current philosophy is the self/no-self debate. Indeed this debate involves other academic fields such as neuroscience, and psychology. One of the problems with the self/no-self debate, as with the debate regarding (self-)consciousness is in defining the terms. As with 'consciousness', there is actually little (if not none) consensus on what 'consciousness' means. Likewise, with the whole self/no-self debate, there is no agreed definition on what is meant by 'self'.

For me, the issue is in the change of question. Rather than ask 'what is the self?' The question in the debate seems to 'what are the features of the self?' The two questions are most certainly related, but are very subtly different. I argue that this 'mutation' is not just a matter of semantics, but is fundamentally important. Consider the following question as a way of illustration: What is Chinese culture?

Before responding, think very carefully the phrasing of the question. The question is in the form of 'what is X?' rather than in the form of 'what are the features of X?' If I responded by listing items such as food, customs, traditions and so on, I can tell you now that I've not answered the question. Instead, I've given a list of what I believe to be important features of Chinese culture, but not what is Chinese culture. Likewise, the debate about the self is one that has transformed to one about features of the self. 
(Of course there are inherent problems with questions like 'what is Chinese culture?' For example, which period of time in history are we talking about? The Tang Dynasty most certainly has a different culture to say the Han dynasty. Why does feature A, but not B, count as Chinese? And how do we define 'Chinese' anyway? While we can't give an answer as cut and dry such as '1+1=2' we can aim for something slightly less stringent. I think of this less stringent answer as something of a correlation, a sort of general rule of thumb. In the case of the 'culture' question, the response may be as follows: 'Chinese culture' refers to the sets of norms and conventions that have emerged and passed down through the generations of Chinese people. These sets of norms and conventions that have been endorsed by the Chinese people. But in order to actually answer the original question, in a way that is universal: Chinese culture is a phenomenon that emerged from the interactions within a group of people, where all members of the group identify as 'Chinese'.)-there are other problems with this response, but I think the basic point stands.

My intent is to directly address the question 'what is the self?' in the most original sense possible. The point is not so much to resolve the self/no-self debate, but to suggest a framework that would give the debate a bit more grounding. 

So what is this 'self'? I want to map my own answer using Li Zehou's 'subjectality' (zhutixing) and Richard Hallam's concept of 'person'.

Li's 'subjectality' focuses on the individual human being's body as well as the actions they perform. The experiences gained by the individual becomes a 'sediment'. Over time, this sediment of experience builds up, giving what Li calls the 'cultural-psychological formation' (CPF). Consider when we first learn to speak, the first people we interact with is our parents. As we grow, we make new friends, we hear about current affairs through the news and so on. In brief, we are always interacting with other persons. Even when reading alone, we are interacting with the author through the book. The point is not that we are interacting with others non-stop, but the fact that we have the experience of doing so. (Consider the learning of language for example, we learn by using the language. In fact, even we interact with ourselves through introspection, we use language to express those thoughts. -Hallam: Virtual Selves Real Persons) The interaction with others is the 'cultural' dimension of CPF. The psychological level is the individual level. Specifically, it is how we integrate the experiences that we have, and the choices we make as a result. Our 'self' is what emerges from our CPF. It is through interactions with others, together with the integration of personal experiences, that we construct our 'self'.

Hallam's account of self is given through his concept of 'person'. The following is a very simplified outline of this concept.
The ‘person’ is a hybrid entity of psychological/physiological complex inside a physical body. There are 3 levels of explanation:

• Supra-personal
• Person
• Sub-personal

Let me begin with the sub-personal.

The sub-personal level of 'person' refers to the biological processes of the human body. This includes the chemical reactions occurring in the cells, to interactions between organs. Then there is the 'system' level where automatic processes such as respiration and homeostasis take place. Above the system level is the 'external' level. At the 'external' level, the body is interacting with the physical world. Reactions such as moving away the finger from the flame, voluntary responses such as walking, and passive processes such as seeing occur at this level. The supra-personal, as the name suggests, refers to the social level. This includes activities such as eating out with friends, marching at a protest, and of course posting on forums. The emphasis is on the interactions between the individual and other persons. The personal level refers to the psychology of the individual including concepts of the 'self'.

The 'self' is an emergent property resulting from the interactions between the individual (sub-person and/or person level) and their interactions with others. The self is 'virtual' in the sense that the self is expressed through the actions of the person. The self represents, but does not define the person. The ‘self’ is like a mask which represents a role in society. A doctor for example is a person who wears a ‘doctor mask’, but for the role to have any meaning, the person wearing the ‘mask’ has to perform functions of a doctor. Similarly, it is through the actions of a person, that the ‘self’ has any meaningful reality. To say that the ‘self’ is a virtual entity is not to deny the ‘realness’ of the self. There is no reason why subscribing to the notion of ‘self’ being a virtual entity entails disbelieving the reality of the ‘self’. Understanding, for example that ‘love’ is really a sequence of biological and psychological (re)actions does not undermine believing in the concept of love. Yet in order for two people to express their love for each other requires the performances of actions. This may be through the use of words, going on dates and other related actions through which the concept of love is expressed. Paraphrasing the words of Hallam, the influence of the ‘self’ is contingent on the person, -where the person is an agent that expresses their ‘self’ through the use of their body.  
(First part end. To be cont')     

本篇文章已被 willyho 於 Jan 28 2016, 00:10 編輯過

Thanks for your sharing. Great read for someone like me who doesn't know much about philosophy.

I'm highly anticipating your next update(s)!

In the first section, a very brief outline of the concepts 'subjectality' and 'person' was given. Before going on to an overview on the history of the self/no-self debate, I want to explore a little further the similarities and the subtle differences between the two concepts. 

The English term 'subjectivity' can be translated into two related, but different terms- 主觀性 (zhuguanxing) and 主體性 （zhutixing). The former is closer to what is meant by 'subjectivity' in traditional western philosophy. The emphasis is placed on 'guan', the ideas or perspectives of the subject. 'Subjectivity' in this sense, is used in fields of philosophy such as epistemology and philosophy of mind. The latter term places emphasis on 'ti', the material substance of the subject, in this case, given that the subject is the individual human being, the human body. What connects 'subjectivity' and 'subjectality' is the process of sedimentation. Li places 'subjectality' as the foundation of 'subjectivity'. In other words, in order for an individual to have psychological properties such as 'self', there must be the physical body. After all, it is only through the actions of the physical body, that experience can be gained. Cognition is embodied inside the brain, which itself is a physical entity. Without the brain, cognition cannot exist. 'Actions' is taken to the broadest sense, including the brain processes, and chemical reactions of the body. CPF is a concept used to describe the interactions between actions and cognition. The ideas and perspectives formed by the individual is a mix of social interactions and individual cognition. On this forum, for example, members tend to think in a certain style in relation to their posts. This tendency correlates to the thinking styles of any given member, with the possibility of cognitive changes over time. Similarly, who we associate with has an effect on us, subtle or otherwise. It is through interactions with others that we gain experience. These experiences gained become a layer of sediment in our psychology. 'Subjectivity' is a result of the interaction between experience and cognition.      

The 'person' is a social/biological complex. For an individual to be regarded as a 'person', they must have gained membership into the community of persons. Similar to CPF, the individual self is developed and expressed through interactions with other persons, and is affected, subtly or otherwise, by the community of which the individual is a member. The interaction does not need to be direct. The type of book one reads, for example can indeed have an effect on the individual. The concept of person, can perhaps be regarded as the English version of 'subjectality'. The difference between 'subjectality' and 'person' is like the difference between two synonyms. Comparing 'subjectality', and 'person', the divisions levels of explanations in 'person' seem a bit more distinct than 'subjectality'. The basic idea, however, is more or less the same.   

To be cont'
  

本篇文章已被 willyho 於 Jan 29 2016, 17:55 編輯過

Would like to see your view on the relationships between self and consciousness.

Consider the following hypothetical situation:

There is an AI which appears to be a strong AI and is capable of passing the Turing test with ease. It is running on a cluster of computers (a "cloud") and appears to perform all cognitive and intellectual functions which a human brain can perform. We still cannot confirm if this AI is conscious or not because we have trouble defining consciousness in purely objective ways. On the other hand, can we say that this AI has a "self"?

And if the answer is yes, what is considered its body? Given that the AI could easily be transferred or even duplicated from one computer cluster to another, should we say that the body is in the software (therefore not physical)? Or should we rather consider the hardware to be its body, which means that a single "self" could jump around different bodies?

Furthermore, if a snapshot (all the code and data at a given point of time) of this AI running in computer cluster A is copied into cluster B and cluster C, and then the AI in cluster A is erased. Has the original "self" been destroyed and two new and independent "self" been created?

I wonder how it fits into your framework of defining "self".

本篇文章已被 徐元直 於 Jan 30 2016, 00:15 編輯過

That sounds like Daniel Dennett's argument. But here's my brief response:

Firstly, I don't believe 'consciousness' to be limited to human beings, and as you said, there are numerous problems defining consciousness. So let's just say I do accept that AI can have 'consciousness'.

The AI is conscious if it is able to modify itself, say streamline its own programming.

The 'self' so to speak is 'expressed' by the software, and requires hardware to run. In other words, what other AIs can 'see' in relation to the individual AI. If AI A can 'see' or receive data from AI B, and as a result can change itself in terms of presentation to B, then AI A has a (sense of) self.

The reminds me of Derek Parfit's paper on self-identity. The AI in cluster A can be said to have survived by B and C. B and C, are descendants of A, connected but not continuous. Just as generations down the line from B and C are descendants of A without requiring continuity. Needless to say, B and C are more strongly connected to A than say D and E.

Personally, I take consciousness to be a part of the brain processes. My 'self' is expressed through my actions using my physical body. What I have is really a sense of self, rather than a 'self'.  

Addition: Subjectality includes consciousness, which is embodied by the physical body. The 'self' or rather the sense of self, is a further development of consciousness. 

本篇文章已被 willyho 於 Jan 30 2016, 02:40 編輯過

A bit off topic:

I don't believe 'consciousness' is to be limited to human beings either.

If it is Dennett making the call, he would definitely say that the AI in my example is conscious, as he rejects the notion of philosophical zombie.

While a true strong AI is nowhere to be found for now, many advanced AI nowadays can already modify the way they 'think' with technologies like deep neuro networks. One example is the recently famous AlphaGo from Google. But of course, the extent of things to which each AI could self-modify is still fairly specific. For instance, the AlphaGo could self-modify the way it interprets the game of Go, but it has no ability to modify itself into a chess AI (I think?), not to mention a general AI. Not many people would consider AlphaGo to be conscious either.

I believe the ability to modify one's own thinking process (in other words, to learn) is not a complete definition of consciousness, but it could be an important aspect of consciousness.

Going back to sense of self. According to your explanation, maybe even the AlphaGo AI should be considered as having a sense of self? I'm saying this because AlphaGo can indeed 'see' or receive data from other AI or human (Go players), and use these data to improve its own playing style. 

Going along this line, does the Chinese pinyin input method I use on my computer also possess a sense of self? Since it does possess the capability to learn from my input habits and change the default word choice for a certain pinyin.

Still, most people would not consider that a pinyin input method is conscious. If the sense of self is a further development of consciousness (which I agree), then the pinyin input method cannot have a sense of self. By the same token most people will not consider AlphaGo as having a sense of self, as long as they believe that it doesn't possess consciousness.

Does this imply that any attempt to answer the question 'what is the self?' will inevitably have to tread on the muddling foundation of the consciousness? Well, if one ventures into the philosophy of mind, it is inevitable. However, I believe Li ZeHou developed his idea of subjectality to answer questions about human nature, which is at a different realm of reality. When strictly dealing with human nature and its relationship to culture and society, it should be okay to take consciousness as a basic assumption rather than dwelling into the mind-body problem like what I'm doing here, because we don't have to justify that humans are conscious. Well, unless you're like this person:

附帶圖片

In hindsight, I should've taken a bit more time in my response to unpack subjectality. Li actually has written a paper outlining the evolutionary process  of how primates became/evolved into primitive human beings. The crux of the argument is that consciousness first came about when apes were aware of their own bodies. Gradually as more and more apes became aware of their own bodies, they started making primitive tools out of natural objects in their surroundings. At first this tool making was random and its success was dependent on trial and error. Gradually over time, the practice of tool making and tool using became more refined. Newer tools were developed from previous tools. The motor forms, or the action sequences involved in the manipulation of tools were memorised, and this memorisation was a form of primitive thought. The practice of tool using and tool making became the praxis, or primitive labour. Gradually, in order to make the process of passing the experience/knowledge from one generation to the next, signs and single syllables were used to represent the motor forms. Eventually, motor forms became secondary in the driving motion of thought. Instead the signs and syllables combined and became a form of primitive language. Human thought went from a sort of motor-thinking to language-led thinking. At the the same time, language also became a medium of communication. The development of language also meant the possibilities of psychological depths in the individual, allowing expressions of the individual through shamanic rites. This was the beginning of the first primitive human societies.

True. But in the self/no-self debate, there are those who want to reduce the self into a physiological process, just as there are those who argue that the self is just a social construct. Then there are those who deny specific aspects of the self. 

The framework was intended more as a criteria that a basically functional account of the self should meet. In other words, an account of the self must take into consideration all three dimensions of the framework: the biological dimension, the psychological, and the social dimension. The individual share of a dimension in an account of the self is up to the theorist to decide.
  

I have not read any of his papers, but I've heard about him and did some research again since you mentioned his idea of subjectality. I was under the impression that he is an eclecticist who integrated Marxist ideas with humanistic views (from Kant and Confucianism?). His emphasis on the creation and utilization of tools is only befitting as the Marxist perspective always focus on modes of production first, rather than ideas of the mind.

Anyway, the narrative you described here still aims at constructing how (proto-)human relationships developed to form culture and society. The mentioning of consciousness seems to only serve as an element for this construction. Is it really the original word used by the author? In my head I was thinking it makes more sense to say "self-awareness first came about when apes were aware of their own bodies" rather than using the term consciousness. It is my understanding that consciousness should be much more primitive than something that only came about on advanced apes. I would consider a lot of animals, at least all mammals and all modern birds to be conscious, with a smaller number of species also having an advanced level of self-awareness (especially the ones that can pass the mirror test).

Actually, you're quite right, come to think of it, especially on the use of 'consciousness' and 'self-awareness'. But in relation to my thesis, what I really perhaps wanted was just the CPF. I only wanted to use subjectality to illustrate that the self can only exist through the actions of the person. Similar to acting roles needing an actor to be 'alive'.

Just another tangent, what are your views on consciousness, and on concepts such as qualia?

*just had another look at Li's paper, he uses 'self-consciousness' so either way, it's closer to your suggestion of 'self-awareness'. 

Now taken into the current draft of thesis

本篇文章已被 willyho 於 Feb 1 2016, 05:14 編輯過

To keep it short: I don't believe in any non-physical properties of qualia. I think with developments in neuroscience we will gradually uncover the neural correlates of consciousness, and eventually be able to "communicate" qualia from one brain/person to another through direct neural connections (the Ramachandran & Hirstein hypothesis). This, however, would require technologies as advanced as those portrayed in The Matrix, which I don't think is reachable in our lifetime.

I'm eager to see the rest of your paper.

To keep it short: I don't believe in any non-physical properties of qualia. I think with developments in neuroscience we will gradually uncover the neural correlates of consciousness, and eventually be able to "communicate" qualia from one brain/person to another through direct neural connections (the Ramachandran & Hirstein hypothesis). This, however, would require technologies as advanced as those portrayed in The Matrix, which I don't think is reachable in our lifetime.

I'm eager to see the rest of your paper.

My take in short is somewhat similar. Perhaps with better technology, there's a better chance of finding neural correlates of consciousness. Perhaps in the future, perhaps we can connect our experiences/qualia on to the world wide web. (A theme that has been done over and over in sci-fi anime, such as ghost in the shell.) Then again, our definition of 'self' would have changed as perceptions of the world changes. 

In regards to my thesis, my plan is to post updates in line with the actual thesis. Inevitably, the posts will probably be a more compressed version of the thesis. Hopefully by the time the paper is finished, a shorter more condensed version is already posted here.